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Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Legal Framework and Enforcement Deficiencies

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ABSTRACT

Corporate governance has become one of the key foundations of economic stability, investor confidence, and sustainable development, especially in the emerging economies like Pakistan. In the last 20 years, Pakistan has been making major legal and regulatory reforms to enhance corporate governance standards, the most important of which have been the company law legislations, securities regulation and codes of corporate governance published by the regulatory bodies. With all of these formal developments, there are significant gaps in terms of enforcement and practical application of corporate governance standards. This paper is a critical review of corporate governance in Pakistan in the context of analysis of the current legal framework, regulatory bodies, and mechanisms of enforcement of corporate behavior of the Pakistani context. It claims that although the corporate governance regime in Pakistan is generally consistent with the international best practice in formal aspects, its performance is compromised by lax enforcement, regulatory capture, high concentration of ownership, low shareholder activism and judge/administrative accountability. The article also has shown that adherence to standards of corporate governance is usually seen as a box-ticking exercise instead of a commitment to transparency, accountability, and protection of the stakeholders. The analysis of corporate governance in Pakistan places the framework of the corporate governance system in a comparative and international context, which identifies systemic loopholes between law and practice and the necessity to enhance and strengthen the institution and culture. It finds that both strong legal rules and plausible enforcement, independent regulators, effective remedies and a governance culture of accountability over compliance are all necessary in order that corporate governance can show meaningful improvement.

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Pakistan; Companies Act; Securities Regulation; Code Of Corporate Governance; Enforcement; Shareholder Protection; Regulatory Institutions; Transparency; Accountability.

Introduction

Corporate governance is a vital factor in determining the effectiveness, openness and integrity of corporate practice, especially in the economies that aim to gain sustainable development and be absorbed in the international markets. Proper corporate governance systems help in ensuring that companies are run in a way that favors the interests of the



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shareholders, the management and other stakeholders involved as well as promoting accountability, transparency and good ethical practices. Corporate governance in Pakistan has become a more prominent aspect because of the liberalization of the markets, growing the corporate sector, and increased involvement with the international financial bodies and investors. The changes have put a strain on the legal system to ensure that corporate governance standards are in conformity with international best practices.¹

The corporate governance structure in Pakistan has been highly developed in the last 20 years. Alterations in the legislation, especially the enactment of the contemporary company law and issuance of Codes of Corporate Governance by the securities regulator, underline an official determination to enhance the corporate monitoring and safeguard the investors. The reforms will be directed towards issues that have plagued the industry over the years, including weak board control, absence of disclosure, and conflict of interests and ineffective minority shareholders protection. Ideally, the legal framework that regulates corporate governance in Pakistan resembles the international standards that are advocated by other institutions like the OECD and the world bank.²

In spite of these formal improvements, there are still entrenched enforcement shortcomings in the corporate governance in Pakistan. The structure of ownership of corporations is very concentrated where family centred businesses dominate the corporate arena. This level of concentration tends to undermine internal control structures, isolate minority shareholders and also allowing related-party dealings to pass without institutional scrutiny. There is a high degree of boards of directors lack of independence and in most instances the managerial accountability is undermined by the solidified control and informal sources of power. Such structural facts do not bode well with the rules of governance that presuppose a dispersed ownership and active shareholder control.³

Another important issue is regulatory enforcement. Although regulatory bodies have far-reaching formal authority to monitor corporate activities, the action is usually selective, slow, or weak. The deterrent effect of the corporate governance laws is weakened by limited institutional capacity, regulation capture, and political influence. The adherence to governance requirements is often viewed as a procedural and not a substantive requirement and this leads to superficial compliance and no real behavior change. Such enforcement loophole harms investor trust and compromises market integrity.

The fact that judicial review of corporate governance cases is a weakness is also indicative of systemic weaknesses. Complex company cases are generally taken a long time to be heard, and there is little specialization in corporate and securities law. The need to endure protracted legal battles, inability of success, and ineffective solutions will put shareholders off the idea of taking legal action. Consequently, formal legal protections are not always effective accountability, which supports a culture of impunity of governance failures.⁴

Such effects of poor corporate governance are not limited to individual companies. Inadequate governance practices also help to misuse finances, instigate market instability as well as low competitiveness on the economy at large. Capital markets find it hard to

¹ Ibrahim, A. A. (2006). Corporate governance in Pakistan: Analysis of current challenges and recommendations for future reforms. *Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev.*, 5, 323.

² Khan, S. H., Nadeem, M., & Ibrahim, S. (2025). Corporate governance in Pakistan: Practices and challenges. *Competitive Research Journal Archive*, 3(02), 118-134.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Javid, A. Y., & Iqbal, R. (2010). Corporate governance in Pakistan: Corporate valuation, ownership and financing.



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build depth and strength and investor confidence is shaky in a corporate accountability environment where corporate accountability is low. These difficulties suggest that the legal framework should be discussed in addition to the enforcing environment within which corporate governance functions.⁵

This paper is an analysis of corporate governance in Pakistan by critically discussing the legal framework and the lack of enforcement that is degrading the effectiveness of corporate governance. It aims at determining whether the current laws and regulatory mechanisms offer sufficient oversight and protection and also identifying the structural and institutional obstacles to sufficient enforcement. Through the use of legislation, regulatory practice and institutional performance, the article seeks to support the argument that to change the level of corporate governance in Pakistan, it is necessary to go beyond formal compliance and into credible compliance, institutional independence and a culture of governance pegged on accountability. The following sections discuss pertinent academic sources, describe the methodological perspective that will be used in this research, describe the legal and institutional framework in which corporate governance occurs, and offer a series of reforms that will enhance the enforcement and make companies more accountable in Pakistan.

Literature Review

The body of research on corporate governance in Pakistan continues to point out the high disparity between the official incorporation of the standards of good governance and their practical application. Initial literature about corporate governance in developing economies posed the problem of governance failure as largely due to poor legal frameworks and poorly developed capital markets. In the Pakistani case, scholars have first paid attention to structural hindrances, including a concentration of ownership, the prevalence of family-owned enterprises, and a lack of activism on the part of investors. The studies made it clear that ownership pattern and social-economic structure are the main contributors of corporate governance problems in Pakistan as opposed to the lack of legal rules.

There is a considerable amount of literature that discusses how the corporate governance system has developed in Pakistan after the market liberalization and regulatory reform. According to scholars like A F Shamsi and others, introduction of Codes of Corporate Governance and modernization of the company law are significant steps towards drawing the Pakistani regulatory framework closer to the international best practices. Based on OECD principles, these reforms will focus on the independence of the board, disclosure and minority shareholder protection. Nevertheless, the literature always states that transplantation of the international governance models in the corporate environment in Pakistan has given little positive outcomes because of the poor enforcement and lack of contextual fit.⁶

The predominant trends in the literature are ownership concentration and family control. M Hussain and others (2025) suggest that corporate structures, which are owned by families, compromise accountability mechanisms and board independence. In these companies, boards are usually controlled by the shareholders with large stakes and do not really serve as independent bodies of checks and balances. This expropriation of power, as the literature suggests, limits the functionality of the governance mechanisms that are

⁵ Ameer, B. (2013). Corporate governance-issues and challenges in Pakistan. *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, 3(4), 79.

⁶ Shamsi, A. F., Bashir, R., & Panhwar, I. A. (2013). Corporate governance in Pakistan: An empirical study. *Transnational Corporations Review*, 5(3), 46-59.



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applicable in the context of dispersed ownership systems and enables practices related to related-party transaction and earnings manipulation.⁷

The enforcement of regulation is generally cited as a major weakness of the corporate governance regime in Pakistan. Research by IA Khan and the findings of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank have shown that there are shortcomings in the ability and autonomy of the regulatory organizations dealing with corporate governance. According to scholars, although regulators have vast formal authority, they have limited resources to enforce the law, political interference and regulatory capture limit their powers. This implementation gap undermines deterrence and promotes symbolic compliance whereby the companies are formally obligated to fall in line with the governance requirements, yet they do not change the underlying practices.⁸

The critical attention has also been directed to the judicial application of the standards of corporate governance. As noted by legal experts like S Fatima 2016, Pakistani courts are usually unprepared to deal with complicated business cases effectively. The costliness of legal proceedings due to procedural delays, absence of expertise and inability to predict results deter shareholders to resort to the judiciary. This has resulted in the existence of legal rights in relation to corporate governance, but they are basically theoretical in nature without much influence on how the managers behave practically.⁹

There is another significant literature strain on disclosure and transparency. Authors of the study on the financial reporting practices in Pakistan observe the continued flaws in the quality and reliability of corporate disclosures. FA Ahmad maintain that poor disclosure destroys market discipline and investor confidence, especially in the emerging markets. According to the literature, poor implementation of the accounting and disclosure standards can enable the presence of information asymmetries, thus undermining the transparency-based governance mechanisms.¹⁰

Comparative studies put the challenges of corporate governance in Pakistan in the larger trend in the emerging and frontier markets. Authors like La Porta et al. note the significance of law enforcing and protecting investors in determining corporate governance performance. Using this framework as an example of Pakistan, researchers suggest that formal legal conformity to the international standards cannot be achieved without credible enforcement and institutional integrity. The comparative analysis supports the argument that governance reform needs to not only design the law but also enforce the law.¹¹

Overall, the literature agrees that corporate governance in Pakistan is marked with strong formal but weak enforcement rules. Researchers have always claimed that governance reforms have been balanced in their focus on the regulatory design and overlooked the institutional capacity, accountability, and governance culture. This academic literature forms the analytical basis of the methodological approach followed in the following part that evaluates the corporate governance regime in Pakistan by applying systematic inspection of the legal framework, fight institutions and enforcement practices.

⁷ Hussain, M., Akhtar, R., & Mushtaq, S. A. (2025). An Analysis of Corporate Governance Legal Framework and Practices in State-owned Enterprises: Insights from Power Sector of Pakistan. *Pakistan Journal of Law, Analysis and Wisdom*, 4 (1), 90-103.

⁸ Khan, I. A. (2014). *Adaptation and convergence in corporate governance to international norms in Pakistan* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Glasgow).

⁹ Fatima, S. (2016). Corporate governance in Pakistan: Beyond a minimalist approach.

¹⁰ Ahmed, F. A. (2025). Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Evaluating SECP Reforms in the Context of International Standards. *Competitive Research Journal Archive*, 3(03), 210-220.

¹¹ La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor protection and corporate governance. *Journal of financial economics*, 58(1-2), 3-27.



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Methodology

This article utilizes doctrinal, and institutional research approach to explore the issue of corporate governance in Pakistan paying special attention to the legal framework and gaps in its enforcement that render the practice ineffective. The methodological approach is anchored on the fact that the result of corporate governance is influenced by the content of the rules within the law as well as the institutions within which the rules are enforced and applied. In this respect, the research will combine the examination of both the statutory law and regulatory instruments as well as institutional practice in order to determine the distance between the formal governance standards and the way they are put into practice.

The initial element of the approach is the doctrinal legal study of the corporate governance system in Pakistan. This entails the analysis of major legislative and regulatory tools that regulate the company behavior such as company law enactment, securities regulation, and corporate governance codes as issued by regulatory bodies. An analysis is made on the provisions of board composition, disclosure and transparency, shareholder rights and internal control mechanisms. The study determines the formal adequacy of the legal framework in Pakistan by measuring the congruence of these provisions with the international governance standards.

The second methodological element considers regulatory organizations that enforce corporate governance. This involves examination of the authority, the mandate, and the operation patterns of securities regulators, stock exchanges, and other similar monitoring bodies. The tools of enforcement that the study assesses include checking tools like inspections, sanctions, disclosure, and monitoring of compliance to establish whether the regulatory devices can prevent governance breaches. The key variables that have been discussed as affecting the effectiveness of enforcement include institutional capacity, independence and accountability.

The third element of the methodology is on judicial enforcement and dispute resolution. Corporate governance controversies can be challenging to handle effectively and expertly in order to offer remedies and influence corporate conduct. This element explores how courts and quasi-judicial organizations can resolve corporate disputes by looking at their efficiency, expertise, and availability of the process. The discussion takes into account the impact of judicial delays, uncertainty, and lack of specialization on the implementation of corporate governance standards and shareholder protection.

As per the accepted method in this series, to improve the clarity and rigor, structured analytical tools are included. Later in the analysis comparative tables can be explained to map the governance obligations with the enforcement mechanisms and the deficiencies observed. Conceptual diagrams can also be used to better depict the enforcement chain of legal rules through regulatory oversight and judicial remedies, where enforcement tends to fail. Such instruments do not simplify institutional dynamics by claims of systematic evaluation.

Another methodological approach that has been adopted is the comparative perspective that takes a brief look at corporate governance enforcement in other emerging markets. Regulatory independence, enforcement strategy, and judicial specialization are discussed in terms of the best practices, based on which comparative insights are employed to determine how they might be applicable to the situation in Pakistan. It is this comparative dimension that offers normative standards and accepts contextual differences in legal and institutional capacity.

Lastly, the assessment model that is used in this study establishes effective corporate governance substantively. As opposed to considering success based on official adherence



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to governance codes, the research determines the extent to which the rules of governance generate any accountability, safeguard the minority equity holders and promote transparency and market integrity. This is a strategy that appreciates the fact that governance reform should be evaluated based on the results and not the presence of the legal tools. The methodological underpinnings herein developed offer the framework to the next section, which presents results of research on the corporate governance framework and lack of enforcement in Pakistan.

Research Findings

The findings of the research indicate that the corporate governance in Pakistan is typified by a large disparity between a rather elaborate legal framework and weak, inconsistent practice. Among the most important ones, there is the fact that the corporate governance laws and regulatory tools of Pakistan are formally well-adjusted to the international standards. Board accountability, disclosure, audit oversight and shareholder rights are some of the main principles of company law provisions, securities regulations and Codes of Corporate Governance. Nevertheless, this formal congruence has failed to yield good governance results and this is mainly because of the shortcomings in enforcement and institutional practice.¹²

One of the main discoveries deals with ownership concentration and control apparatus. In Pakistan, the corporate world is characterized by family business and closely-owned companies where the controlling shareholders hold a lot of power in the managerial and board decisions. Boards of directors in these areas are not really independent, in spite of formal independence of director requirements. The results show that independent directors are often nominated by informal networks and do not have the independence required to provide a challenge to the management or shareholders who exert control on the company. This structural fact decreases the efficiency of the board-based governance systems and internal accountability.¹³

The enforcement of the regulations becomes a key area of weakness. Although regulatory bodies have longstanding statutory mandates to check compliance, administer punishments and demand disclosure, such efforts are usually selective and reactive. The results indicate that regulatory interventions have more of a procedural non-compliance as compared to substantive governance failure. Fines on governance breaches are often small and not enough to discourage malpractices, which upholds a notion that non-compliance has fewer repercussions. This lack of enforcement promotes a culture of formal compliance with no significant change in behaviour.¹⁴

Table 1: Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Enforcement Deficiencies in Pakistan

Governance Area	Formal Legal Requirement	Observed Enforcement Deficiency
Board independence	Mandatory independent	Lack of genuine independence

¹² Imran, M., & Nordin, R. (2018). Good governance in Pakistan: Challenges and recommendations. *International Journal of Law, Government and Communication*, 3(10), 01-11.

¹³ Mughal, R. M. (2014). Good governance in Pakistan: problems and proposed solution. *International Journal of Modern Business issue of Global Market (IJMBIGM) Vol, 2*, 40-58.

¹⁴ Arslan, M., Abidin, S., Alqatan, D. A., & Roudaki, J. (2019). Corporate governance in extreme institutional environment: evidence from emerging economy. *Corporate Ownership & Control*, 17(1).



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Governance Area	Formal Legal Requirement	Observed Deficiency	Enforcement
	directors		
Disclosure	Periodic financial reporting	Weak verification and oversight	
Audit committees	Independent oversight required	Limited effectiveness	
Minority shareholder rights	Voting and remedies provided	Low utilization, weak remedies	
Related-party transactions	Disclosure and approval required	Inadequate scrutiny	

Corporate governance standards are also enforced by judicial means, which is indicative of much difficulty. Corporate disputes are often taken a long time to be settled in court, and judges might not have specialized knowledge on corporate and securities law. The results show that the long litigation process, complexity of the process, and uncertainty of the results scares the shareholders, especially the minority investors, away to seek the legal redress. Consequently, judicial enforcement is not working as a meaningful deterrent to violation of governance and misconduct continues with minimal responsibility.¹⁵

The results also point to the gaps in disclosure and transparency. Disclosure requirements themselves are formally strong, but enforcement is spotty and there is a wide range of quality of corporate disclosure. Governance reports and financial statements can be based on the official reporting standards and conceal significant information of interest to investors. This is because the accounting and auditing standards are not enforced strictly, and this reduces the market discipline and confidence of investors.

The other significant discovery is associated with weak shareholder activism. Pakistan has institutional and minority shareholders who seldom exercise their rights to governance (voting, litigation, and management). Part of this passivity can be explained by concentrated structures in ownership, yet also by a lack of faith in regulatory and judicial solutions. In the absence of active shareholders supervision, market-based governance arrangements are ineffective.¹⁶

Altogether, the findings of the research indicate that the shortcomings of corporate governance in Pakistan are not mainly associated with poor legal regulations, but with poor enforcement, institutional pressures, and organizational aspects of the corporate community. There are formal standards of governance, albeit their effect is watered down by the lack of regulatory capacity, judicial ineffectiveness and deeply rooted control mechanisms. It is based on these findings that the following discussion is founded and explores the interactions between legal design, enforcement practices and corporate culture to influence the governance outcomes in Pakistan.

Discussion

The concluding results of this paper emphasize the fact that the corporate governance in Pakistan is conditioned by the structural dissonance between formal legal high-level and

¹⁵ Khalid, A. M., & Hanif, M. N. (2005). Corporate governance for banks in Pakistan: Recent developments and regional comparisons.

¹⁶ Siddiqui, J. (2010). Development of corporate governance regulations: The case of an emerging economy. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 91(2), 253-274.



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the failure of practical enforcement. It can be seen in the discussion that the reforms in the corporate governance of Pakistan have mostly been a rule-transplant model, in which foreign practices in law are imported and applied in the domestic law without taking enough consideration to the local ownership structure, regulatory capacity and enforcing realities. This makes corporate governance rather a compliance practice other than an accountability mechanism.

One of the key concerns that arise out of the discussion is the supremacy of concentrated and family-based ownership. Models of corporate governance that have been entrenched in the Pakistani legal system presuppose dispersion of shareholding and board supervision, which is hardly practical. In the case of boards and management dominated by controllers, formal requirements of independent directors and audit committees will lose their purpose. Such disalignment of the law and the business reality undermines the internal control and transforms the conflicts of interest into a strong hold.¹⁷

Weaknesses in regulatory enforcement processes also contribute to the lack of good governance. Although the regulators have large statutory powers, the fact that they use them selectively and cautiously is a weakness because of deterrence. It has been mentioned in the discussion that enforcement has frequently focused on procedural adherence, including the filing of reports in a timely fashion, rather than on governance concerns like transactions involving related parties, insider control and board accountability. Lack of sanctions, discretion of the regulations, and political power create a sense that there is a tolerable risk of the violations of governance instead of a grave violation of law. This vision undermines the incentives to comply as well as market discipline.¹⁸

The other structural bottleneck is judicial enforcement. Courts are very important in the process of enforcing the rights of shareholders and corporate disputes but the judicial system of Pakistan has problems with slowness, lack of specialization and procedural complexity. The discussion highlights that lax judicial relief will deter the idea of redress to the shareholders especially in cases where the expenses of litigation and time loss are more than the potential gains. This compromises the effectiveness of the protection of the law and perpetuates the governance failures with little legal repercussions.¹⁹

The corporate culture has also been identified in the discussion as a determining factor of governance results. Governance in most firms is perceived to be an external regulation mandate and not an internal ethical obligation. This compliance based attitude restrains the success of governance reforms based on voluntary adherence, disclosure and self-regulation. Unless there is a cultural change in regard to accountability and transparency then even in the presence of formal rules one cannot change corporate behavior.

These conclusions are supported by comparative intuitions. The practice of other emerging markets proves that in case the legal rules are to be supported with the well-developed enforcement institutions, judicial specialization, and market participants, the corporate governance reforms are the most effective. The experience of Pakistan indicates that with poor enforcement capacity and structural realities it is not easy to

¹⁷ Ali Shah, S. Z., Butt, S. A., & Hassan, A. (2009). Corporate governance and earnings management an empirical evidence from Pakistani listed companies. *European Journal of Scientific Research*, 26(4), 624-638.

¹⁸ Tariq, Y. B., & Abbas, Z. (2013). Compliance and multidimensional firm performance: Evaluating the efficacy of rule-based code of corporate governance. *Economic Modelling*, 35, 565-575.

¹⁹ Sultan, N. (2022). *A comparative study on interdependent role of control mechanisms in corporate governance and financial reporting quality in USA, UK, South Africa, and Pakistan* (Doctoral dissertation, Aberystwyth University).



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achieve much by concentrating on legal design without considering the enforcement capacity.

All in all, it can be concluded that the issues of corporate governance in Pakistan are systematic, not accidental. These are a product of the combination of concentrated ownership, lax regulatory enforcement, limited judicial capacity, and compliance-oriented corporate culture. The solution to these problems should be to go beyond formal legal alignment to substantive institutional reform and accountability.

Recommendations

To strengthen corporate governance in Pakistan, it is necessary to have a holistic approach to reform that assists in fixing the weaknesses of enforcement, institutional capacity and governance culture. Among the key suggestions, it is the increase in regulatory enforcement potential and autonomy. The regulators must put a premium on substantive violations of governance, ensure that there are substantial sanctions and risk-based enforcement measures that are more oriented towards systemic risks than procedural failures. There would be more credibility and deterrence by increasing regulatory independence and shielding the enforcing decisions against political interference.

Reform and specialization in the judiciary is also important. It would be effective and efficient to have specialized corporate or commercial benches that would have the expertise in the field of corporate and securities law in order to enhance quality and efficiency in the adjudication. Reducing the process of taking action by shareholders and derivative suits would reduce the hurdles to enforcement and provide access to more remedies. According to regulatory action, good judicial enforcing would enforce heavily and also encourage investor confidence.

Ownership concentration realities should also be dealt with via corporate governance reforms. The law should be adjusted so as to offer more protective systems to minority shareholders in privately-owned businesses in the form of better disclosure of related-party decisions, cumulative voting models, as well as the tightening of the approval belt around conflicted decisions. The empowerment of the minority shareholders would assist in balancing concentrated control and enhancing accountability.

Another important area of reform is to promote shareholder activism and market discipline. The institutional investors are supposed to be encouraged to exercise their voting rights and be involved in discussing the matter of governance with management. Enhancement of disclosure quality and transparency would make investors be able to make informed decisions and pressurize the firms that are poorly governed. This change could be facilitated by regulatory incentives and stewardship codes.

There is also the need to build capacity and change culture in the corporations. Internal accountability would be enhanced through board training programs, director professional development and instilling governance principles on corporate strategy. To make the governance not a compliance burden but a strategic asset, it may be encouraged that the ethical leadership and long-term value creation are promoted.

Lastly, there is need to integrate corporate governance reforms with further economic and legal reform agendas to make it sustainable. To strengthen the accountability of the system, governance should be improved in connection to the development of capital markets, reform of the financial sector, and anti-corruption efforts.



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Conclusion

This paper has discussed the issue of corporate governance in Pakistan by critically reviewing the legal framework and the lack of enforcement on the legal provisions that make corporate governance ineffective. The paper has shown that Pakistan has had an otherwise fairly elaborate list of corporate governance legislations and regulatory tools, which have however little operational efficiency attributed to their laxity in application, condensed ownership frameworks, judicial incompetence, and compliance-based corporate ethos.

The key finding of this discussion is that corporate governance reform in Pakistan has been overemphasized on formal legal correspondence with international standards, and has overlooked the institutional and structural requirements of implementing the reforms. The problem of governance is not a lack of law but of the existence of gaps in enforcement and lack of accountability that have made it possible to tolerate certain misconduct with minimal penalty.

The article also points out that corporate governance is necessary to protect investors but also the economy in general and sustainable economic growth. Poor governance impacts negatively on market confidence, distortion in resource allocation and growth of the capital market. Enhancement of governance, thus, has legal and economic ends.

To sum up, significant change in corporate governance in Pakistan is achievable only when symbolic adherence to corporate governance changes to credible enforcement and institutional accountability. Through enhancing regulatory and judicial capacity, realigning rules of governance to the ownership reality, and building a culture of transparency and accountability, Pakistan can redesign its corporate governance system as a formal regulatory framework to an effective accountability mechanism that helps the country to promote long-term economic growth and investor trust.

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