



Vol. 3 No. 9 (September) (2025)

Federalism after the 18th Constitutional Amendment: A Critical Evaluation of Centre–Province Relations in Pakistan

Yasir Arfat

Lecturer, School of Law, University of Gujrat Email: yasir.arfat@uog.edu.pk

Naveed Hussain

Assistant Professor, School of Law, University of Gujrat

Email: naveed.hussain@uog.edu.pk

Rao Qasim Idrees

Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Gujrat Email: qasim.rao@uog.edu.pk

ABSTRACT

The 18th Constitutional Amendment 2010 was a landmark reform initiative in the federal organization of Pakistan that decentralized widespread authority of the federal government to the provinces. This paper is a critical review of the development of centre–province relationship in the ten years since the amendment. The analysis concludes that the 18th Amendment enhanced provincialism and redistributed legislative and fiscal authority to the federating units, which resolved the historical grievances of smaller provinces. It removed the Concurrent Legislative List, increased the provincial contribution to the national coffers, and augmented forums of intergovernmental coordination like the Council of Common Interests. These reforms have created a more inclusive federal system, which, however, has shown new problems in implementation. The provinces had increased influence in the policy and resources and imbalance in administrative capacity has resulted in disparity in service delivery. The relationship between the center and the provinces has continued to experience tensions especially in the sharing of resources and harmonization of policies, and this raises some concern about the ability of the nation to maintain itself and the quality of governance. Overall, though the 18th Amendment was an important move towards true federalism in Pakistan, as pointed out in this study, there is a need to build intensive cooperative systems and capacity building to achieve the full potential of the 18th Amendment.

Keywords: Federalism, Provincial Autonomy, 18th Amendment, Centre–Province Relations, Decentralization, Pakistan

Introduction

Since its birth, the federation of Pakistan has been experiencing problems of power distribution between the central government and the provinces. Initial constitutional provisions (including the 1956 and 1962 charters) maintained power concentrated in a small number of hands, which helped create provincial resentment and led to such disasters as the secession of East Pakistan in 1971. A compromise was made in the 1973 Constitution, providing a defined powers for the provinces and a Concurrent Legislative List that shared common subjects, although in reality each new government took away provincial autonomy, particularly by military regimes. Smaller provinces such as Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) began to



Vol. 3 No. 9 (September) (2025)

believe they were sidelined by the time the 2000s, and thus there was a strong demand to realistically reform the federal structure.¹

In 2010, Pakistan has passed the 18th Constitutional Amendment unanimously, and this is a milestone aimed at rekindling federalism in the constitution of 1973 that had been centralized over the decades. The highlight of the amendment was the repeal of the Concurrent List that transferred a wide scope of matters such as education, health, agriculture and social welfare to provincial control only. This offered provinces vastly increased powers legislative and executive, and left the federal parliament with matters specially designated to it (such as defense, foreign affairs, and currency). Basically, the amendment decentralized governance to provinces on a massive scale that essentially changed the relations between the center and the provinces.²

These changes in legislation were accompanied by financial devolution. The provincial share of federal tax revenue (which had been about 47 percent) rose significantly (to about 57.5 percent) in 2009 under the new distribution formula with the increase favoring less populated and poorer provinces by the 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award. With better powers as well as better resources, provincial governments would be left to control their own affairs and use local demands better, and this would eliminate long-term complaints about the control of the policies and funding by the Islamabad dominance.³

The amendment as well strengthened the cooperative federal institutions to address the new power sharing arrangement. It required the Council of Common Interests (CCI) which consisted of the leaders of the center and provinces to hold regular meetings as a vehicle to solve the intergovernmental problems and create a policy on those issues that had common grounds. On the same note, the National Economic Council (NEC) was also reinstated to provide the provinces with greater influence in the national economic planning and coordination of development. These organizations were supposed to make sure that decentralization would be followed by dialogue and consensus-building and avoidable conflict between the center and the federating units.⁴

The result of these reforms was that the system of governance in Pakistan became more reminiscent of classical federation: provinces are now constitutionally entitled to independence in a variety of areas, and the federal government is narrowed both in national and international matters. With hurdles in the implementation did not go without such sweeping devolution; twelve plus ministries of the federal government (including education and health) needed to be abolished or handed over to the provincial government in the process. Over 10 years later, it is relevant to unravel the extent to which the 18th Amendment has ever been true to its word of a peaceful federalism. The present paper analyses the post-amendment trends in the relationship between centres and provinces with references to the gains realised and the challenges of new governance that have cropped up during the endeavours to bring about federalism in Pakistan.

¹ Munawar, C. S., & Mushtaq, M. (2022). Evolution of Federalism in Pakistan: A Constitutional Study. *Pakistan Journal of Social Research*, 4(4), 468-479.

² Faiz, A. (2023). Center-Sindh relations in Pakistan after the 18th amendment: Anatomy of executive federalism under the PTI government 2018–2022. *Journal of Sindhi Studies*, 3(2), 1-19.

³ Jaffrelot, C., Waseem, M., & Faiz, A. (2024). Mapping the post-18th Amendment federalism in Pakistan: hegemony, centralization or cooperation?. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 62(3), 185-205.

⁴ Ahmed, S. J. (2013). Historical Evolution of Federalism in Pakistan: From Bewilderment to Setting up of a Path. *Pakistan Perspectives*, 18(2).



Vol. 3 No. 9 (September) (2025)

Literature Review

Federalism is a structure where the governmental powers have a constitutional split between the central government and sub government and allows both the sharing of rule and self-rule. It is viewed in ethnically diverse states as a means to coexist with various groups of people by providing them with a degree of autonomy and at the same time maintaining national cohesiveness. Pakistan is historically experiencing centralization during its experience with federalism. The frameworks of the early years had limited autonomy between the provinces as the Government of India Act of 1935, along with the 1956 and 1962 constitutions, gave only partial powers to the provinces and kept the majority of powers in the federal government. Analysts have claimed that this excessive centralization caused political dissatisfaction and instability even to be part of the break-up of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971. The 1973 Constitution introduced a more balanced federal system but the same was not able to work as the new provisions were marred by authoritarian interventions (including the 8th Amendment by General Zia-ul-Haq) which brought the power back to the center. By the 2000s, scholars and policymakers were in agreement that Pakistan had to reset its federal system, to enable provincial complaints to be resolved and national integration to be enhanced.⁵

Another point that has been noticed by many observers as a major stride towards a more functional federalism in Pakistan is the 18th Amendment. Advocates observe that the amendment rebalanced the constitutional arrangement to the varying socio-political reality in the country and it gave provincial governments the power to make policies based on the local demands. Through decentralization, the reform was meant to establish trust between the center and provinces and eliminate past tensions. Analysts offered that curbing the unilateral decision of the central government would reduce provincial grievances and curb the secessionist moods in the editable provinces. It was also hoped that enhanced provincial autonomy would enhance democracy: decentralization of power would make the federal government less able to dominate or dismiss provincial regimes, and military intervention into politics could be discouraged. More so, a better separation of responsibilities was anticipated to enhance accountability, as citizens would be able to find out easier which level of government was responsible in service delivery or policy outcomes. Initial indications since 2010 have indicated that provinces have gone ahead with spearheading such areas as education and health implying that devolved governance has provided opportunity to be innovative and come up with solutions that are region specific.⁶

Conversely, there is also a body of critical literature that cautions on the gains made by the 18th Amendment that are subject to how well the implementation has been made. One of the concerns is the disparity in the ability of provincial governments. Faced with new responsibilities, not all of the provinces had personnel and institutional capacity to efficiently manage such subjects as high-education accreditation, drug control, or environmental control. This increased the chances of service delivery gaps or inconsistency of regulations during the initial years of devolution. However, according to the fiscal critics, though provinces were gaining access to more funds, most of them still continue to rely on federal transfers to the majority of their budgets which demonstrates little progress in generating their own revenues. Without any incentives to mobilize local revenue, the subnational governments may not fully apply their fiscal responsibility. The

⁵ Chandio, J. (2014). Crisis of federalism in Pakistan: Issues and challenges. *Federalism in Asia and beyond The Wildbad Kreuth Federalism Days 2012*, 119.

⁶ Tariq, M., Malik, M. S., & Qumber, G. (2018). Prospects of Federalism in Pakistan. *Global Social Sciences Review*, 3(2), 356-368.



Vol. 3 No. 9 (September) (2025)

policy coordination between provinces is another challenge that has been mentioned. Freedom of each province to legislate in areas of importance has led to differences e.g. in school curriculums and the health programs which may divide the socio-economic environment of the country. Other scholars also observe that the amendment did not proceed to provincial devolution and neither empowered the local governments, thus in some instances, power concentrated at the provincial level which may not necessarily lead to governance at the grassroots. These critiques imply that the amendment has modified the constitution design although the success of the federal system of Pakistan will depend on capacity building, intergovernmental coordination, and political will to realize the potential of the amendment.⁷

Methodology

The paper utilizes a doctrinal design in exploring how the 18th Amendment affected interrelations between Centre's and provinces. The analysis will be carried out through a review of the constitutional provisions and a synthesis of the resources of other sources such as government reports, legislative records and scholarly analysis done during the post-amendment era. The text of the 18th Amendment, National Finance Commission (NFC) award reports and proceedings of the Council of Common Interests were looked at to chart the formal changes and how they were implemented. The comparison between the data prior to and after the amendment (e.g., changes in the provincial budgets allocation and the activity in the legislature) were also taken into account to detect trends. The triangulation of these sources helps the research to point out important patterns and examples but not exhaustive statistics. This model creates a possibility to evaluate the role of the devolution of powers using evidence and their impact on federal governance in Pakistan.

Research Findings

In the legislative and administrative sphere, the 18th Amendment abolished the Concurrent Legislative List, which allowed the provinces to have the full control over dozens of subjects that were before divided with the center. Practically, education, healthcare, agriculture and social welfare areas of the policy were handed over to the provinces. The federal government, in turn, disbanded or decentralized several ministries and departments; by the middle of 2011, already 17 federal ministries (such as education and health) were abolished or transferred to the provinces. This was a radical administrative change in the history of Pakistan, which fundamentally changed the gears of the administration.⁸

But the shift showed the gaps in capacity and problems in coordination. The provinces had to quickly take over roles that Islamabad had been playing and this was not available to all the provinces in terms of institutions and expertise. As an example, the provincial level had to recreate the standard-setting bodies and regulatory frameworks in such areas as higher education and drug administration. In other cases it was necessary to have interim or ad hoc arrangements so as not to disrupt, the federal government in some cases proceeded to offer guidance or services until the provinces had accumulated their capabilities. Such initial setbacks suggested that legal empowerment was not sufficient to

⁷ Khan, I., Ullah, F., & Khan, B. (2021). Democracy and federalism in Pakistan: an analysis of PPP Government (2008-2013). *Global Regional Review*, 6(1), 36-49.

⁸ Adeney, K. (2012). A step towards inclusive federalism in Pakistan? The politics of the 18th amendment. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 42(4), 539-565.



Vol. 3 No. 9 (September) (2025)

ensure good autonomy, but rather it should be supported by investments in provincial institutional capacity and definition of roles to avoid overlaps and confusion.⁹

In the fiscal front, the fiscal reforms under the 7th NFC Award were supplementary to the constitutional changes as they absorbed the financial transfers to the provinces to a great extent. The provincial federal tax revenue increased to 57.5 percent which allows the subnational governments to expand their development programs and social services. The provincial budget on education, health, and infrastructure increased and previously underserved areas received more investment with more funds available. The fact that the NFC now used new criteria in equitable distribution that did not only base the allocation on the population but also on other factors such as poverty levels and land area especially benefited smaller provinces that corrected some historical imbalances.¹⁰

Nevertheless, financial problems continue to play a rather eminent role in the relationship between the center and provinces. Although they receive more resources, provincial governments still rely on federal transfers as a majority of their expenditures, since they still have low ability to increase revenues by their own resources (provincial taxes on agriculture, property, services, etc.). This addiction has sometimes created tensions - such as when federal income declines or the central government calls on the provinces to tighten the belt, they are usually opposed to any change that would damage their political status. Also, higher devolution of funds has limited the fiscal space of the federal government itself, and at times, made it more difficult to pursue initiatives on a national level that need to be co-funded or implemented consistently across the provinces. Basically, the fiscal dimension of the 18th Amendment gave authority to the provinces, though it also emphasized the importance of improved fiscal management and income level at subnational level to make it long term sustainable.¹¹

Another change has been on intergovernmental coordination, which occurred during the post-amendment era. The Council of Common Interests has also been an important mechanism of managing the federation; they discuss policies that traverse the provinces or that need collective decision (energy policy, sharing of resources and nationwide standards in education or health). CCI meetings have been held at a greater frequency since 2010 and provinces have been able to use this platform in a proactive manner to air out concerns and negotiate solutions. There have been remarkable results of water sharing, electricity distribution, and natural resource revenue-sharing formulas which were not made unilaterally by the federal but by the consensus of CCI. This is a good sign of a positive change in solving problems through dialogue and institutional procedures.¹²

Intergovernmental relations continue to change even with these improvements. The success of the CCI (and the parallel organizations such as the National Economic Council, etc.) depends on the political situation. There have been occasional times when the leadership parties between the center and a province have made cooperation a challenge and the decision making process has taken longer or unwillingness to include disputable issues on the CCI agenda. Others which were not settled during meetings have

⁹ Iqbal, S. A., Raza, M. A., Ahmad, F., & Hussain, R. (2025). FEDERALISM IN PAKISTAN: CHALLENGES, REFORMS, AND THE QUEST FOR POLITICAL STABILITY. *Policy Journal of Social Science Review*, 3(5), 136-152.

¹⁰ Rana, M. A. (2020). Decentralization experience in Pakistan: the 18th constitutional amendment. *Asian Journal of Management Cases*, 17(1), 61-84.

¹¹ Shakoor Chandio, A., Tunio, F. H., & Korai, A. G. (2024). Federalism in South Asia: a constitutional analysis of India and Pakistan. *Cogent Arts & Humanities*, 11(1), 2299536.

¹² Kureshi, Y., Sayeed, A., Waseem, Z., & Adil, S. (2024). Federalism in a hybrid regime: The 18th Amendment in Pakistan.



Vol. 3 No. 9 (September) (2025)

also led to court battles and in most cases the Supreme Court has joined in supporting the purpose of intent to decentralize in its rules which have been mostly in favor of the intent of the 18th Amendment. In addition, due to the fact that the provinces now make their own laws in most areas, coordination had to be informal in order to ensure unity. As a case in point, best practices have been exchanged and policies harmonized at regular conferences of provincial ministers (facilitated by federal government) on issues such as education curriculums or health emergencies. These attempts highlight the fact that cooperative federalism in Pakistan is a dynamic process that needs to be marked with constant devotion to consultation and compromise.¹³

The other important indicator of the influence of the amendment is the area of delivery of services and developmental outcomes. Some good steps have been achieved due to the devolution: provinces have undertaken projects that are more in line with the populations they serve and this has resulted in the service delivery innovations. As an example, one province introduced a geographically-based health insurance system, another had launched a vigorous school enrolment drive - policies that would not otherwise have surfaced on a nation-wide basis. In instances when these experiments have succeeded, they have given models of how other provinces should follow, and an inter-provincial healthy competition of improving governance has been created. Moreover, the provincial governments have become directly responsible to their citizens in central services, thus placing more pressure on the governments to bring about practical outcomes in sectors such as education, health, and development.¹⁴

But not all has been smooth and there are still problems. In the less-developed provinces, the increase of funds and powers, being received by itself, has not necessarily resulted in the improvement of services, much owing to the inefficiency of the administrative capability and control. Issues such as teacher absenteeism, lack of healthcare coverage, projects have been lagging on are still causing troubles in some of the areas, which implies that devolution is not a panacea to governance problems that are deep-rooted. Short-term disruptions have also occurred, such as when national programs were devolved, it took time to increase the mechanisms of the provinces, and in the process, some services were disrupted, or even had gaps or inconsistencies. Devolution fails to reach to the grassroots in some cases unless there are good local governments under the provincial level; the empowerment of the district level is not a link in the chain. In turn, although the 18th Amendment gave a chance to better governance and development, the opportunities can be fulfilled only in case the institutions at all the levels of federation are reinforced and autonomy is accompanied by accountability.

Discussion

The post 18th Amendment era validates the fact that the process of constitutional change has changed the Pakistani politics a great deal. Power has become more diffusely distributed: provinces have become more active participants of the action than mere subordinates, and a new form of pluralism in the governance process has been introduced. The national policies and discussions have to be more receptive to provincial views, a manifestation of a growing federation where no particular unit can prevail one over the other. The more frequent application of intergovernmental forums and the necessity of negotiating shows that the culture of politics in Pakistan is slowly evolving to a more

¹³ Yaseen, M., & Alvi, A. S. (2025). Evolution of Federalism in Pakistan: From 1947 to 18th Amendment. *Evolution*, 3(10).

¹⁴ NASEER, P., Rauf, M., & Ahmad, N. (2025). Analysis of Federalism in Pakistan. *Advances and Issues in Social Sciences*, 40-62.



Vol. 3 No. 9 (September) (2025)

consultative approach instead of the previously used top-down one. In most ways this progress has contributed to improving the stability of the system: since all the provinces have an investment in the decision-making process, the federation has a higher probability of becoming stable in the long-term as the stakeholders will feel that their voices will be heard via the constitutional processes.¹⁵

Meanwhile, the past decade experience demonstrates that legal devolution in itself is not a panacea in governance issues. The shift has shown the extent to which centralized practices were embedded, and it has not been able to change without new laws. There were also a few federal organizations that were reluctant to give up authority, and likewise, there were provincial organizations that were unwilling or hesitant to assume new roles. The norms and trust in cooperative federalism to establish harmony is a matter of time, consulting regularly, respecting jurisdictions, and having a problem-solving attitude. Centre-province relation has been occasionally spoilt by the political partisanship (e.g. when the opposing parties rule in Islamabad and a provincial capital), and the example shows that individual and party interests can still hinder the cooperation between institutions. Despite all this, the trend has been more toward endorsement of the new paradigm: in fact, there is no significant political interest to revert to the 18th Amendment that exists today. This agreement implies that Pakistan has adopted the concept of decentralization and opted to ensure that it works more efficiently as opposed to discussing its validity. Besides, the amendment did not specify the creation of the local governments; greater provincial commitment was behaved unevenly; this implies that the fruits of devolution have not been made available at the grassroots across board, and this is where reforms in the future can be made.¹⁶

The main issue heading forward is how the federal government can achieve provincialism and nationalism. Although the amendment gave provinces authority, it also requires more cohesion to have a single-minded approach in issues of general significance. Up to date, provincial policy differences albeit real have been implemented by use of dialogue. As an example, at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the first disparities in provincial actions were resolved by creating a federal-provincial task force (the National Command and Operation Center), where health-related actions were coordinated, which demonstrates the capacity of the system to unite during a crisis. Such differences have not in essence risked the national unity. To make sure that this is the situation continuing, Pakistan should keep enhancing intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms. The solution to inefficiencies or inequalities which may have been as a result of devolution is not to revert to centralization, but to move the communication and collaboration between the federal units. Fundamentally, the nation must become more engaged in a deeper model of cooperative federalism in which the diversity of local solutions is exercised within a mutually agreed model of national standards and goals. The 18th Amendment was a much-needed correction to decades of excessive centralization; the work going ahead is to perfect and streamline the federal system that it gave rise to. Through long term dedication toward capacity building, dialogue and joint responsibility, Pakistan can make the 18th Amendment promise a sustainable reality of enhanced governance and a more peaceful federation.

¹⁵ Waseem, M. (2011). Pakistan: A majority-constraining federalism. *India Quarterly*, 67(3), 213-228.

¹⁶ Shah, A. (2012). *Making federalism work: the 18th constitutional amendment*. World Bank, Washington, DC.



Vol. 3 No. 9 (September) (2025)

Recommendations

Empower intergovernmental institutions: Institutions such as the CCI ought to be empowered to the fullest and held in regular meetings to pre-empt and solve conflicts. The CCI can be assisted by a specific secretariat and expert working groups that could help to implement the decisions. Such forums used proactively to coordinate policies will create a sense of trust and ensure that conflicts are avoided at the initial stages.

Restore fiscal federalism: The National Finance Commission is to gather semi-annually to revise the revenue-sharing formulas according to the evolving demographics and economic realities. Further NFC grants may include an incentive to provinces to boost their own sources of revenue and be financially prudent. An improved coordination of center-province on budgetary-related issues (e.g., through a common fiscal committee) will allow sustaining macroeconomic stability without impairing provincial autonomy.

Develop provincial capacity: Develop administrative and technical capacities of provincial governments to enable them to control devolved functions. This may involve the training of provincial civil servants, cross-provincial best practices, and forums to work together in areas of specialization (e.g. curriculum development or in public health). Increasing the capacity will help the provinces to maximize their autonomy and deliver better services.

Empower local governments: Provinces should be further devolved to the elected local governments. The provincial governments must have frequent local government elections and assign sufficient functions and funds to the districts and municipalities. Strong local government will have the decision-making made nearer to the citizens; the benefits of devolution will be realized at the grass-roots.

Ensuring national standards: This involves coming up with minimum standards in key areas that are agreed upon by all to ensure unity in the country. As an example, each province could settle on standard education syllabuses or health care standards that would offer similar access to the citizens in all provinces. Such standards, which are established by consultation (preferably via the CCI) would nonetheless enable provinces to develop and maintain a national basic structure.

Clear up uncertainties and wrangles: Develop clear guidelines on how to deal with center-province wrangles. It is possible to strengthen the Inter-Provincial Coordination Ministry, which will act as an intergovernmental mediator, and to create joint commissions to resolve particular conflicts (water distribution or energy projects). In case of any ambiguity in the division of powers in the constitution, resolve the issue by formulating mutual understanding or where there is a need to do it through formal amendments with wide consensus. The systematic process of conflict resolution will minimize the lack of trust in the federation.

Build a participatory culture: Enhance a political culture of collaboration between the center and provinces. The two levels of the leaders are to focus on dialogue, respect the mandates of each other, and not to engage in rhetoric that pits the federating units against each other. Goodwill can be achieved through regular intergovernmental consultations, joint planning and inclusive decision-making (involving provinces in national initiatives since the very beginning). However, in the long run, the structural benefits of the 18th Amendment will be supported by a culture of collaboration and coexistence.

Conclusion

The 18th Constitutional Amendment has no doubt changed the federal set up of Pakistan to rectify historical bias towards centralization. It also gave the provinces unprecedented control and funds in which the long time held resentment about unfair power



Vol. 3 No. 9 (September) (2025)

dissemination. In this analysis, it is determined that the amendment has been successful in making the federal set-up more participative: provinces are now more aware in the national matters as well as hold accountability in their own growth. It has led to an improvement of the relations between the centers and the provinces in fundamental forms. However, the last ten years also show that although decentralization was needed, it was not an easy task to implement. Inequality in administrative capacity and a few cases of failure to coordinate has been counterintuitive to certain anticipated gains. There have been significant improvements in the manner in which governance and service delivery are conducted in some sectors, but in others, progress has been slow or less than expected.

In sum, the 18th Amendment still stands as a landmark on the way to a more akin and unified federation. More importantly, it has many advocates on both sides of the political divide, and this cuts across a common belief of a decentralized future of Pakistan. The trick ahead is not to reverse the devolution but to perfect it, through enhancing the institutions, promoting collaboration, and making all governmental levels accountable. Federalism in Pakistan is a journey yet to be made, but is heading the right way, that may bring the country more national harmony and good governance. By continuing to work towards the unfinished tasks, then Pakistan can unlock the full potential of the 18th Amendment and have a sustainable balance between provincial autonomy and a united vision of the national objective. By so doing, the nation will be honoring the spirit of the constitution and the principle of unity in diversity in which the federal system is based.

References:

- Adeney, K. (2012). A step towards inclusive federalism in Pakistan? The politics of the 18th amendment. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 42(4), 539-565.
- Ahmed, S. J. (2013). Historical Evolution of Federalism in Pakistan: From Bewilderment to Setting up of a Path. *Pakistan Perspectives*, 18(2).
- Akram, M., & Alvi, A. S. (2022). Provincial Autonomy in Pakistan: With Respect to 18th Constitutional Amendment. *VFAST Transactions on Education and Social Sciences*, 10(4), 137-147.
- Ali, M., & Shafiq, M. O. (2016). Redefining Right to Information, Federalism and Decentralization Mechanism in Pakistan: Post 18th Amendment perspective. *Journal of Mass Communication Department, Dept of Mass Communication, University of Karachi*, 14.
- Arshad, F., Chawla, M. I., & Zia, A. (2018). Re-contextualizing the 18th Amendment: Working of Federalism in Pakistan. *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, 55(2).
- Ashraf, M. I. (2016). Federalism and Provincial autonomy: Political and Economic Dimensions under the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Unpublished) Ph. D. Thesis submitted to: Politics and IR, IIU Islamabad, Pakistan, 36.
- Chandio, J. (2014). Crisis of federalism in Pakistan: Issues and challenges. *Federalism in Asia and beyond The Wildbad Kreuth Federalism Days 2012*, 119.
- Faiz, A. (2023). Center-Sindh relations in Pakistan after the 18th amendment: Anatomy of executive federalism under the PTI government 2018–2022. *Journal of Sindhi Studies*, 3(2), 1-19.
- <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/687281468057882110/pdf/871020NWP0B0x30ing0Federalism0Work.pdf>
- https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350878371_Making_Federation_Work_Federalism_After_the_18th_Amendment_in_Pakistan_ed



Vol. 3 No. 9 (September) (2025)

- Iqbal, S. A., Raza, M. A., Ahmad, F., & Hussain, R. (2025). FEDERALISM IN PAKISTAN: CHALLENGES, REFORMS, AND THE QUEST FOR POLITICAL STABILITY. *Policy Journal of Social Science Review*, 3(5), 136-152.
- Ishfaq, U., Sanam, K., & Ashfaq, K. (2022). Federalism Crises in Pakistan: Impacts on Centre-Province Relations. *Global Political Review*, VII, 1-8.
- Jaffrelot, C., Waseem, M., & Faiz, A. (2024). Mapping the post-18th Amendment federalism in Pakistan: hegemony, centralization or cooperation?. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 62(3), 185-205.
- Khan, I., Ullah, F., & Khan, B. (2021). Democracy and federalism in Pakistan: an analysis of PPP Government (2008-2013). *Global Regional Review*, 6(1), 36-49.
- Khan, Z. (2012). Constitutional Reforms in Pakistan: federalism after the 18th amendment. *Federalism in Asia and beyond The Wildbad Kreuth Federalism Days 2012*, 193.
- Khatoon, H. (2023). *The Dynamics of Federalism in Pakistan: An Examination of Political: Structures and Challenges*.
- Kureshi, Y., Sayeed, A., Waseem, Z., & Adil, S. (2024). Federalism in a hybrid regime: The 18th Amendment in Pakistan.
- Munawar, C. S., & Mushtaq, M. (2022). Evolution of Federalism in Pakistan: A Constitutional Study. *Pakistan Journal of Social Research*, 4(4), 468-479.
- Munawar, S., BUTT, A. J., & LATIF, A. (2023). Pros and Cons of 18th Amendment: A study of Center-Province relations 2010-2022. *Jahan-e-Tahqeeq*, 6(3), 292-298.
- NASEER, P., Rauf, M., & Ahmad, N. (2025). Analysis of Federalism in Pakistan. *Advances and Issues in Social Sciences*, 40-62.
- Rana, M. A. (2020). Decentralization experience in Pakistan: the 18th constitutional amendment. *Asian Journal of Management Cases*, 17(1), 61-84.
- Rid, S. A. (2019, September). Federalism in Pakistan: Evolving from a highly centralised federal system to a more decentralised federal structure. In *Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2019* (pp. 373-384). Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.
- Shah, A. (2012). *Making federalism work: the 18th constitutional amendment*. World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Shakoor Chandio, A., Tunio, F. H., & Korai, A. G. (2024). Federalism in South Asia: a constitutional analysis of India and Pakistan. *Cogent Arts & Humanities*, 11(1), 2299536.
- Tabssum, D. S., Mustafa, D., Niaz, D., Mahmood, D., & Shabbir, D. (2023). Historical Narration Of Federalism In Pakistan. *Journal of Positive School Psychology (JPSP)*, 7, 1727-1741.
- Tariq, M., Malik, M. S., & Qumber, G. (2018). Prospects of Federalism in Pakistan. *Global Social Sciences Review*, 3(2), 356-368.
- Waseem, M. (2011). Pakistan: A majority-constraining federalism. *India Quarterly*, 67(3), 213-228.
- Yaseen, M., & Alvi, A. S. (2025). Evolution of Federalism in Pakistan: From 1947 to 18th Amendment. *Evolution*, 3(10).